"Why would the Attorney General write an order relying upon state diversion controls when DEA and HIDTA intelligence appear to document repeated failures in those same markets?" Duane Boise CEO of MMJ International Holdings asked.
Part One examines Oklahoma, California, Oregon, Colorado and Washington-and asks whether High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) intelligence reports contradicted the factual premise of the Attorney General's rescheduling order.
WASHINGTON, DC / ACCESS Newswire / August 18, 2026 / MMJ International Holdings, Inc. ("MMJ") today announced the first installment of a two-part examination of federal and state law enforcement information concerning illegal marijuana production, inversion and diversion associated with state legal cannabis markets.
The first installment examines Oklahoma, California, Oregon, Colorado and Washington.
A second installment will examine five additional states and the broader question of whether the Department of Justice and the White House considered intelligence generated through the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas program before the Attorney General relied upon state marijuana systems as the foundation for preferential federal treatment.
The issue is straightforward.
DEA, HIDTA task forces, federal prosecutors, state auditors and state regulators have repeatedly documented or alleged circumstances involving:
Criminal organizations operating in legal-marijuana states;
State licenses being used to conceal unlawful cultivation;
Marijuana leaving licensed cultivation facilities for interstate distribution;
Illegally produced marijuana entering state-authorized businesses;
Unexplained inventory discrepancies;
Deficient seed-to-sale tracking;
Inadequate inspection and enforcement resources;
Manipulated laboratory results; and
Unregulated marijuana entering the regulated supply chain.
Nevertheless, Attorney General Order No. 6754-2026 concluded that state medical-marijuana systems, "taken as a whole," possessed a sustained capacity to prevent diversion and perform functions serving the objectives of federal registration.
That conclusion requires an explanation.
"DEA and HIDTA intelligence personnel were not operating in the dark," said Duane Boise, Chief Executive Officer of MMJ International Holdings. "They knew that criminal organizations were exploiting legal-marijuana states and that illegal marijuana was moving out of-and in some cases allegedly into-state-authorized businesses. The public does not know whether that intelligence ever reached the Attorney General's desk. If it did, the order does not explain how he reconciled it with his finding that state systems could be trusted to prevent diversion."
WHAT HIDTA MEANS
HIDTA stands for High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas.
Congress created the HIDTA program through the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 to assist federal, state, local and tribal law-enforcement agencies operating in regions identified as critical drug trafficking areas.
The program is administered by the Office of National Drug Control Policy, commonly known as ONDCP, within the Executive Office of the President.
There are 33 HIDTAs covering designated counties in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
DEA describes itself as playing a "very active role" in the program, with more than 1,500 authorized special-agent positions dedicated to HIDTA. Federal law also requires DEA participation in each HIDTA intelligence support center.
Each regional HIDTA is directed by an executive board composed of equal numbers of federal and nonfederal law-enforcement leaders. Those boards bring together DEA, other federal agencies, state police, local departments, sheriffs and tribal authorities.
HIDTAs develop regional threat assessments, strategies, intelligence products and performance reports. Historically, those materials have been reviewed through ONDCP processes involving representatives from the Department of Justice and other federal departments.
This means HIDTA intelligence does not exist outside the federal government. It is produced through a program administered from within the Executive Office of the President and supported extensively by DEA and other DOJ components.
What remains unknown is whether the specific marijuana-diversion findings were presented to, requested by or reviewed by the Attorney General or senior White House officials before Order No. 6754-2026 was issued.
THE PUBLIC-SECRECY PROBLEM
Some older HIDTA threat assessments and drug-market analyses are publicly available. Many current regional intelligence products, however, are not readily accessible to the public.
That creates a troubling imbalance.
Federal and regional law-enforcement agencies may possess detailed information about illegal cultivation, licensed-market exploitation, interstate trafficking, inversion and diversion. State regulators may receive regional assessments concerning vulnerabilities within their own jurisdictions.
But patients, physicians, consumers, courts and the broader public may never see the complete intelligence record.
The Attorney General's order publicly announced a favorable conclusion about state regulatory capacity without publicly identifying the contrary DEA and HIDTA information that may have been available to the government.
The question is not whether every intelligence report must be released without redaction. Operational information, confidential sources and investigative methods require protection.
The question is whether the government may rely upon state licensure as the basis for federal Schedule III treatment without disclosing the material findings, risk assessments and contrary evidence it considered-or failed to consider.
STATE ONE: OKLAHOMA
Oklahoma presents perhaps the clearest example of criminal exploitation reaching inside a state licensing system.
Federal prosecutors obtained convictions in a conspiracy involving nearly 28 tons of black-market marijuana shipped from Oklahoma City. Trial evidence reportedly connected the conspiracy to a marijuana grow licensed by the Oklahoma Medical Marijuana Authority.
Law enforcement found approximately 19,661 marijuana plants, more than $100,000 in vacuum-sealed cash and a firearm at the licensed location.
The U.S. Attorney stated:
"A license under state law to grow marijuana is not a license to traffic tons of black-market marijuana inside or outside Oklahoma."
Oklahoma authorities have similarly described criminal organizations attempting to hide and operate within the state medical-marijuana program.
This was not merely unlicensed marijuana growing somewhere in a state where marijuana happened to be legal. The prosecution demonstrated that a state-issued license could be used as part of the operating environment for alleged large-scale diversion.
STATE TWO: CALIFORNIA
California has struggled for years with a massive illicit cultivation and distribution market operating alongside its licensed system.
Federal intelligence has historically documented criminal exploitation of California's medical-marijuana laws, excessive cultivation under the appearance of state authorization and marijuana moving from California to markets throughout the country.
State and municipal audits have also identified weaknesses involving licensing delays, compliance inspections, fragmented enforcement and the continued dominance of illegal operators in certain areas.
California's experience demonstrates that the existence of extensive regulations does not establish effective control. A regulatory system may appear comprehensive on paper while lacking sufficient inspection, enforcement and verification capacity in practice.
STATE THREE: OREGON
Oregon has repeatedly confronted marijuana produced under the protection or appearance of state legality being diverted into interstate markets.
Federal prosecutions and law-enforcement reports have described Oregon marijuana transported to other states. Regulators have also faced challenges involving production substantially exceeding legitimate in-state demand, inventory reconciliation and the monitoring of licensed cultivation.
Oversupply is not merely an economic problem. When production materially exceeds lawful demand, the excess creates both an incentive and an opportunity for diversion.
Before relying on Oregon credentials for expedited federal treatment, DOJ should disclose whether it evaluated the state's production levels, inspection capacity, inventory discrepancies and interstate-trafficking cases.
STATE FOUR: COLORADO
Colorado was among the first states to construct a comprehensive commercial marijuana system. It has also supplied some of the earliest evidence that detailed state regulations and seed-to-sale tracking do not eliminate diversion.
Federal cases have implicated people associated with state-authorized marijuana businesses in schemes involving marijuana transported beyond Colorado.
Colorado's experience is particularly important because it is frequently presented as evidence that state marijuana regulation has matured. Yet maturity cannot be measured only by the age or complexity of the regulatory framework. It must be measured by outcomes-including whether licensed marijuana remains within authorized channels.
STATE FIVE: WASHINGTON
Washington's own state auditors have identified important weaknesses in cannabis oversight and inventory tracking.
A 2024 follow-up audit identified continuing areas of risk involving the diversion of cannabis into illegal hands and inaccurate tax reporting. Earlier findings addressed unreliable or incomplete tracking information and the state's ability to use that data effectively for enforcement.
A seed-to-sale system is only as reliable as the information entered into it and the regulator's ability to verify that information physically.
If plants, transfers, destruction, production yields or inventory adjustments are incorrectly recorded, an electronic database can create the appearance of control without establishing what happened to the physical marijuana.
DID THE WHITE HOUSE KNOW?
Because ONDCP administers the HIDTA program from within the Executive Office of the President, the White House cannot treat HIDTA intelligence as information generated by an unrelated outside organization.
That does not establish that the President personally reviewed any particular assessment.
It does establish that the federal drug-control infrastructure responsible for collecting and analyzing regional trafficking intelligence resides within the President's own executive organization.
MMJ therefore asks:
Did ONDCP provide the White House with HIDTA findings concerning marijuana diversion and inversion?
Did senior White House officials request an assessment of state marijuana systems before supporting Schedule III?
Were regional HIDTA threat assessments supplied to the Attorney General, DOJ or DEA leadership?
Did DOJ compare those assessments with the Attorney General's conclusion that state systems possessed a sustained capacity to prevent diversion?
Were any contrary findings omitted from the administrative record supporting the order?
If current HIDTA intelligence remains nonpublic, will ONDCP release redacted versions sufficient to permit public evaluation?
DID THE ATTORNEY GENERAL KNOW?
DEA is a component of the Department of Justice. DEA participates in HIDTA intelligence operations and dedicates substantial personnel to the program.
DEA's 2025 National Drug Threat Assessment publicly warned:
"Chinese transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) dominate the domestic cultivation and distribution of marijuana, with most grow sites located in states where the cannabis industry is 'legal.'"
Eleven months later, the Attorney General credited state medical-marijuana systems with a sustained ability to prevent controlled substances from entering illicit channels.
The two positions may be capable of reconciliation. Criminal organizations may operate illegally in states that also maintain legitimate regulated businesses.
But the order does not explain whether the Attorney General:
Reviewed DEA's national assessment;
Reviewed regional HIDTA threat assessments;
Distinguished licensed from unlicensed criminal operations;
Examined inversion into licensed supply chains;
Compared the performance of individual state systems;
Evaluated the accuracy of state inventory and laboratory records; or
Established minimum federal safeguards before allowing qualifying applicants to operate while their DEA applications remained pending.
The absence of that explanation is now impossible to ignore.
WAS THIS THE DIVERSION EVIDENCE BEHIND DR. AKINFIRESOYE'S TESTIMONY?
According to contemporaneous hearing notes obtained by MMJ, DEA pharmacologist Dr. Luli Akinfiresoye testified during the marijuana-rescheduling hearing about diversion associated with state marijuana programs.
MMJ's notes indicate that she agreed state medical-marijuana programs were a significant source of diversion and testified that state medical and recreational programs appeared, at least to an extent, to be a primary source of marijuana diversion and availability in the United States.
Those descriptions must be verified against the certified transcript before being presented as direct quotations.
The public also does not yet know the complete intelligence foundation underlying her conclusions.
Did Dr. Akinfiresoye review HIDTA threat assessments? Did she rely upon DEA intelligence, federal prosecutions, state enforcement records or other nonpublic information? Were the materials available to the Attorney General? Were they included in-or excluded from-the administrative record supporting the April 2026 order?
If the certified transcript and exhibits establish that DEA's own pharmacologist relied upon federal intelligence identifying state programs as a significant diversion source, that evidence would sharply complicate an order premised on the diversion-control capacity of those same systems.
SIGNIFICANT CONSEQUENCES FOR PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY
Diversion and inversion are not merely jurisdictional or tax problems.
When marijuana moves outside regulated channels, the government may lose control over:
Product origin;
Chemical composition;
THC concentration;
Pesticide and contaminant testing;
Manufacturing conditions;
Packaging and labeling;
Distribution destinations;
Sales to minors;
Adverse-event reporting; and
Product recalls.
When illegally produced marijuana enters a licensed market, state credentials and tracking records may give an unverified product the appearance of regulatory legitimacy.
When licensed marijuana leaves the regulated market, products may be distributed across state lines without reliable testing, labeling, age controls or traceability.
These activities can adversely affect patients, consumers, legitimate businesses, law enforcement and communities far beyond the state where the marijuana was cultivated.
WHY WOULD THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ISSUE THIS ORDER?
The Attorney General may have concluded that the benefits of using existing state infrastructure outweighed the identified risks. He may have distinguished illegal grows from legitimate state licensees. He may have relied upon additional evidence showing that state systems had improved.
But the published order does not provide that analysis.
It announces that state systems, taken as a whole, have demonstrated a sustained capacity to prevent diversion. It does not identify the states examined, the performance measures used, the diversion data reviewed or the contrary intelligence considered.
"Why would the Attorney General write an order relying upon state diversion controls when DEA and HIDTA intelligence appear to document repeated failures in those same markets?" Boise asked. "There may be an explanation. The government has not provided it. Before state licenses become federal passports into Schedule III, the Attorney General and the White House should disclose what they knew, when they knew it and how they reconciled the intelligence."
WHAT MMJ IS REQUESTING
MMJ calls upon DOJ, DEA and ONDCP to disclose:
The HIDTA threat assessments and marijuana-intelligence summaries reviewed in connection with Order No. 6754-2026;
The identities of the state systems evaluated by the Attorney General;
The diversion, inversion, inspection and enforcement metrics used;
Communications between DOJ, DEA, ONDCP and the White House concerning state marijuana controls;
The evidentiary basis for finding that state systems possessed a sustained capacity to prevent diversion;
The materials underlying Dr. Akinfiresoye's reported testimony; and
Any analysis distinguishing licensed, license-associated and entirely unlicensed criminal operations.
Appropriate redactions may protect active investigations, confidential sources and law-enforcement methods. They should not be used to conceal the factual basis of a nationwide regulatory decision.
Part Two of MMJ's examination will address Michigan, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nevada and New York.
ABOUT MMJ INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS, INC.
MMJ International Holdings, Inc. is a privately held pharmaceutical company developing standardized cannabinoid-based investigational medicines through federal pathways administered by FDA and DEA.
MMJ holds two Investigational New Drug files with FDA and Orphan Drug Designation for its Huntington's disease program. MMJ BioPharma Labs holds a DEA Schedule I analytical-laboratory registration. MMJ BioPharma Cultivation has a pending DEA bulk-manufacturing application.
MMJ's investigational programs concern potential treatments for Huntington's disease and multiple sclerosis.
CONTACT:
Madison Hisey
MHisey@mmjih.com
203-231-8583
STATEMENT
Descriptions of Dr. Luli Akinfiresoye's hearing testimony are based on contemporaneous hearing notes obtained by MMJ from an interested party who attended the DEA administrative proceeding. They are not presented as certified transcript quotations and must be verified against the official transcript before use in litigation, regulatory submissions or direct quotation.
References to HIDTA intelligence describe the structure and documented functions of the HIDTA program. MMJ does not presently claim that President Trump, Attorney General Blanche or any particular official personally reviewed a specific HIDTA assessment. MMJ is requesting disclosure sufficient to determine what materials were transmitted, reviewed or considered.
Criminal charges and administrative allegations discussed in this release are allegations unless otherwise indicated. Defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty. Individual cases do not establish misconduct by every licensee or the failure of every state regulatory system.
MMJ's product candidates are investigational, have not been approved by FDA and remain subject to Full Clinical Hold. No clinical trials involving MMJ's product candidates have been completed, and no conclusions concerning safety or efficacy may be drawn.
Nothing herein constitutes an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to purchase any security.
SOURCE: MMJ International Holdings, Inc.
View the original press release on ACCESS Newswire:
https://www.accessnewswire.com/newsroom/en/healthcare-and-pharmaceutical/did-the-white-house-and-attorney-general-ignore-federal-intel-about-m-1208931
